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Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge andjustified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concernedwith the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficientconditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure,and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemologyaims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the conceptof justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Isjustification internal or external to one’s own mind? Understood morebroadly, epistemology is about issues having to do with thecreation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry.This article will provide a systematic overview of the problems thatthe questions above raise and focus in some depth on issues relating tothe structure and the limits of knowledge and justification.

• By focusing on two areas of philosophy-critical reasoning, and epistemology-the paper explores the possibility of using two popular music videos for the teaching of deductive and inductive.
• Both by the tradition and by recent developments. A superb introduction.’ Ernest Sosa, Brown University ‘An excellent book. It is comprehensive in scope and very systematically organised.’ Philosophical Books ‘This is a massively impressive book, introducing the reader to virtually all areas of epistemology.
• 1. What is Knowledge?
• 2. What is Justification?
• 3. The Structure of Knowledge and Justification
• 4. Sources of Knowledge and Justification
• 5. The Limits of Knowledge and Justification
• 6. Additional Issues

1 Introduction My task, in this short essay, is to discuss epistemology, theory, and methodology in the field of Knowledge Organization (KO). This is not an easy thing to do, because even a casual glance at the literature shows that epistemic, theoretical, and methodological concerns constitute the driving force behind argument.

1. What is Knowledge?

1.1 Knowledge as Justified True Belief

There are various kinds of knowledge: knowing how to do something(for example, how to ride a bicycle), knowing someone in person, andknowing a place or a city. Although such knowledge is ofepistemological interest as well, we shall focus on knowledge ofpropositions and refer to such knowledge using the schema‘S knows that p’, where‘S’ stands for the subject who has knowledge and‘p’ for the proposition that is known.[1] Our questionwill be: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions forS to know that p? We may distinguish, broadly,between a traditional and a non-traditional approach to answering thisquestion. We shall refer to them as ‘TK’ and‘NTK’.

According to TK, knowledge that p is, at leastapproximately, justified true belief (JTB). False propositions cannotbe known. Therefore, knowledge requires truth. A proposition Sdoesn’t even believe can’t be a proposition that S knows.Therefore, knowledge requires belief. Finally, S’s beingcorrect in believing that p might merely be a matter of luck.[2] Therefore, knowledge requires a thirdelement, traditionally identified as justification. Thus we arrive at atripartite analysis of knowledge as JTB: S knows thatp if and only if p is true and S isjustified in believing that p. According to this analysis, thethree conditions — truth, belief, and justification — areindividually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge.[3]

Initially, we may say that the role of justification is to ensurethat S’s belief is not true merely because of luck. On that,TK and NTK are in agreement. They diverge, however, as soon as weproceed to be more specific about exactly how justification is tofulfill this role. According to TK, S’s belief that pis true not merely because of luck when it is reasonable or rational,from S’s own point of view, to take p to be true.According to evidentialism, what makes a belief justified inthis sense is the possession of evidence. The basic idea is that abelief is justified to the degree it fits S’s evidence. NTK,on the other hand, conceives of the role of justification differently.Its job is to ensure that S’s belief has a high objectiveprobability of truth and therefore, if true, is not true merely becauseof luck. One prominent idea is that this is accomplished if, and onlyif, a belief originates in reliable cognitive processes or faculties.This view is known as reliabilism.[4]

1.2 The Gettier Problem

The tripartite analysis of knowledge as JTB has been shown to beincomplete. There are cases of JTB that do not qualify as cases ofknowledge. JTB, therefore, is not sufficient for knowledge.Cases like that — known as Gettier-cases[5] — arise because neither the possession of evidence nor origination inreliable faculties is sufficient for ensuring that a belief is not truemerely because of luck. Consider the well-known case of barn-facades:Henry drives through a rural area in which what appear to be barns are,with the exception of just one, mere barn facades. From the road Henryis driving on, these facades look exactly like real barns. Henryhappens to be looking at the one and only real barn in the area andbelieves that there’s a barn over there. Henry’s belief is justified,according to TK, because Henry’s visual experience justifies hisbelief. According to NTK, his belief is justified because Henry’sbelief originates in a reliable cognitive process: vision. Yet Henry’sbelief is plausibly viewed as being true merely because of luck. HadHenry noticed one of the barn-facades instead, he would also havebelieved that there’s a barn over there. There is, therefore, broadagreement among epistemologists that Henry’s belief does not qualify as knowledge.[6]

To state conditions that are jointly sufficient for knowledge, whatfurther element must be added to JTB? This is known as the Gettierproblem. According to TK, solving the problem requires a fourthcondition. According to some NTK theorists, it calls for refining theconcept of reliability. For example, if reliability could suitably beindexed to the subject’s environment, reliabilists could say thatHenry’s belief is not justified because in his environment, vision isnot reliable when it comes to discerning barns from barn-facades.[7]

Some NTK theorists bypass the justification condition altogether.They would say that, if we conceive of knowledge as reliably producedtrue belief, there is no need for justification. Reliabilism, then,comes in two forms: as a theory of justification or as a theory ofknowledge. As the former, it views justification to be an importantingredient of knowledge but, unlike TK, grounds justification solely inreliability. As a theory of knowledge, reliabilism asserts thatjustification is not necessary for knowledge; rather, reliably producedtrue belief (provided the notion of reliability is suitably refined torule out Gettier cases) is sufficient for it.[8]

2. What is Justification?

When we discuss the nature of justification, we must distinguishbetween two different issues: First, what do we mean when weuse the word ‘justification’? Second, what makesbeliefs justified? It is important to keep these issues apart because adisagreement on how to answer the second question will be a mere verbaldispute, if the disagreeing parties have different concepts ofjustification in mind. So let us first consider what we might mean by‘justification’ and then move on to the non-definitional issues.[9]

2.1 Deontological and Non-Deontological Justification

How is the term ‘justification’ used in ordinarylanguage? Here is an example: Tom asked Martha a question, and Martharesponded with a lie. Was she justified in lying? Jane thinks she was,for Tom’s question was an inappropriate one, the answer to which wasnone of Tom’s business. What might Jane mean when she thinks thatMartha was justified in responding with a lie? A natural answer isthis: She means that Martha was under no obligation to refrainfrom lying. Due the inappropriateness of Tom’s question, it wasn’tMartha’s duty to tell the truth. This understanding ofjustification, commonly labeled deontological, may be definedas follows: S is justified in doing x if and only ifS is not obliged to refrain from doing x.[10]

Suppose, when we apply the word justification not to actions butto beliefs, we mean something analogous. In that case, the term‘justification’ as used in epistemology would have to bedefined this way:

Deontological Justification (DJ)
S is justified in believing that p if and only ifS believes that p while it is not the case that S is obligedto refrain from believing that p.[11]

What kind of obligations are relevant when we wish to assess whether abelief, rather than an action, is justified or unjustified?Whereas when we evaluate an action, we are interested in assessing theaction from either a moral or a prudential point of view, when it comesto beliefs, what matters is the pursuit of truth. Therelevant kinds of obligations, then, are those that arise when we aimat having true beliefs. Exactly what, though, must we do in thepursuit of this aim? According to one answer, the one favored byevidentialists, we ought to believe in accord with our evidence. Forthis answer to be helpful, we need an account of what our evidenceconsists of. According to another answer, we ought to follow thecorrect epistemic norms. If this answer is going to help us figure outwhat obligations the truth-aim imposes on us, we need to be given anaccount of what the correct epistemic norms are.[12]

The deontological understanding of the concept of justification iscommon to the way philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Moore andChisholm have thought about justification. Today, however, the dominantview is that the deontological understanding of justification isunsuitable for the purposes of epistemology. Two chief objections havebeen raised against conceiving of justification deontologically. First,it has been argued that DJ presupposes that we can have a sufficientlyhigh degree of control over our beliefs. But beliefs are akin not toactions but rather things such as digestive processes, sneezes, orinvoluntary blinkings of the eye. The idea is that beliefs simply arisein or happen to us. Therefore, beliefs are not suitable fordeontological evaluation.[13] To this objection, some advocates of DJhave replied that lack of control over our beliefs is no obstacle tousing the term ‘justification’ in its deontological sense.[14] Others have argued that it’s a mistake tothink that we can control our beliefs any less than our actions.[15]

According to the second objection to DJ, deontological justificationdoes not tend to ‘epistemize’ true beliefs: it does not tendto make them non-accidentally true. This claim is typically supportedby describing cases involving either a benighted, culturally isolatedsociety or subjects who are cognitively deficient. Such cases involvebeliefs that are claimed to be epistemically defective even though itwould not seem that the subjects in these cases are under anyobligation to refrain from believing as they do. What makes the beliefsin question epistemically defective is that they are formed usingunreliable and intellectually faulty methods. The reason why thesubjects, from their own point of view, are not obliged to believeotherwise is that they are either cognitively deficient or live in abenighted and isolated community. DJ says that such beliefs arejustified. If they meet the remaining necessary conditions,DJ-theorists would have to count them as knowledge. According to theobjection, however, the beliefs in question, even if true, could notpossibly qualify as knowledge, due to the epistemically defective waythey were formed. Consequently, DJ must be rejected.[16]

Those who reject DJ use the term ‘justification’ in atechnical sense that deviates from how the word is ordinarily used. Thetechnical sense is meant to make the term suitable for the needs of epistemology.[17] But how are we then to conceive ofjustification? What does it mean for a belief to be justified in anon-deontological sense? Recall that the role assigned to justificationis that of ensuring that a true belief isn’t true merely by accident.Let us say that this is accomplished when a true belief instantiatesthe property of proper probabilification. We may, then, definenon-deontological justification as follows:

Non-Deontological Justification (NDJ)
S is justified in believing that p if and only ifS believes that p on a basis that properly probabilifiesS’s belief that p.

If we wish to pin down exactly what probabilification amounts to, wewill have to deal with a variety of tricky issues.[18] For now, let us justfocus on the main point. Those who prefer NDJ to DJ would say thatprobabilification and deontological justification can diverge: it’spossible for a belief to be deontologically justified without beingproperly probabilified. This is just what cases involving benightedcultures or cognitively deficient subjects are supposed to show.[19]

2.2 Evidence vs. Reliability

What makes justified beliefs justified? According toevidentialists, it is the possession of evidence. What is it, though,to possess evidence for believing that p? Some evidentialistswould say it is to be in a mental state that represents p asbeing true. For example, if the coffee in your cup tastes sweet to you,then you have evidence for believing that the coffee is sweet. If youfeel a throbbing pain in your head, you have evidence for believingthat you have a headache. If you have a memory of having had cereal forbreakfast, then you have evidence for a belief about the past: a beliefabout what you ate when you had breakfast. And when you clearly ‘see’or ‘intuit’ that the proposition ‘If Jack had more than four cups ofcoffee, then Jack had more than three cups of coffee’ is true, then youhave evidence for believing that proposition. In this view, evidenceconsists of perceptual, introspective, memorial, and intuitionalexperiences, and to possess evidence is to have an experience of thatkind. So according to this evidentialism, what makes you justified inbelieving that p is your having an experience that representsp as being true.

Many reliabilists, too, would say that the experiences mentioned inthe previous paragraph matter. However, they would deny thatjustification is solely a matter of having suitable experiences.Rather, they hold that a belief is justified if, and only if, itresults from cognitive origin that is reliable: an origin that tends toproduce true beliefs and therefore properly probabilifies the belief.Reliabilists, then, would agree that the beliefs mentioned in theprevious paragraph are justified. But according to a standard form ofreliabilism, what makes them justified is not the possession ofevidence, but the fact that the types of processes in which theyoriginate — perception, introspection, memory, and rationalintuition — are reliable.

2.3 Internal vs. External

In contemporary epistemology, there has been an extensive debate onwhether justification is internal or external. Internalists claim thatit is internal; externalists deny it. How are we to understand theseclaims?

To understand what the internal-external distinction amounts to, weneed to bear in mind that, when a belief is justified, there issomething that makes it justified. Likewise, if a belief isunjustified, there is something that makes it unjustified.Let’s call the things that make a belief justified or unjustifiedJ-factors. The dispute over whether justification is internal orexternal is a dispute about what the J-factors are.

Among those who think that justification is internal, there is nounanimity on how to understand the concept of internality. We candistinguish between two approaches. According to the first,justification is internal because we enjoy a special kind of access toJ-factors: they are always recognizable on reflection.[20] Hence,assuming certain further premises (which will be mentionedmomentarily), justification itself is always recognizable on reflection.[21] According to the second approach,justification is internal because J-factors are always mental states.[22] Let’s call the former accessibilityinternalism and the latter mentalist internalism.Externalists deny that J-factors meet either one of theseconditions.

Evidentialism is typically associated with internalism, andreliabilism with externalism.[23] Let us see why. Evidentialism says, at aminimum, two things:

E1 Whether one is justified in believing p dependson one’s evidence regarding p.E2 One’s evidence consists of one’s mental states.

By virtue of E2, evidentialism is obviously an instance of mentalistinternalism.

Whether evidentialism is also an instance of accessibilityinternalism is a more complicated issue. The conjunction of E1 and E2by itself implies nothing about the recognizability of justification.Recall, however, that in Section 1.1 we distinguished between TK andNTK: the traditional and the nontraditional approach to the analysis ofknowledge and justification. TK advocates, among which evidentialismenjoys widespread sympathy, tend to endorse the following twoclaims:

Luminosity
One’s own mind is cognitively luminous: Relying on introspection, onecan always recognize on reflection what mental states one is in.[24]

Adobe ifilter 9 download. Necessity
a priori recognizable, necessary principles say what isevidence for what.[25] Relying on a priori insight, onecan therefore always recognize on reflection whether one’s mentalstates are evidence for p.[26]

Although E1 and E2 by themselves do not imply access internalism, itis quite plausible to maintain that evidentialism, when embellishedwith Luminosity and Necessity, becomes an instance of access internalism.[27]

Next, let us consider why reliabilism is an externalist theory.Reliabilism says that the justification of one’s beliefs is a functionof, not one’s evidence, but the reliability of one’s belief sourcessuch as memorial, perceptual and introspective states and processes.Whereas the sources might qualify as mental, their reliability doesnot. Therefore, reliabilists reject mentalist internalism. Moreover, ifthe justification of one’s beliefs is determined by the reliability ofone’s belief sources, justification will not always be recognizable onreflection. Hence reliabilists reject access internalism as well.[28]

Let’s use an example of radical deception to illustrate thedifference between evidentialism as an internalist theory andreliabilism as an externalist theory. If evidentialism is true, asubject who is radically deceived will be mislead about what isactually the case, but not about what he is justified in believing. If,on the other hand, reliabilism is true, then such a subject will bemisled about both what is actually the case and what he is justified inbelieving. Let us see why.

Distinguish between Tim and Tim*: one and the same person whom weimagine in two altogether different situations. Tim’s situation isnormal, like yours or mine. Tim*, however, is a brain in a vat. Supposea mad scientist abducted and ‘envatted’ Tim* by removing his brain fromhis skull and putting it in a vat in which his brain is kept alive.Next, the mad scientist connects the nerve endings of Tim*’s brain withwires to a machine that, controlled by a powerful computer, startsstimulating Tim*’s brain in such a way that Tim* does not notice whatactually happened to him. He is going to have perfectly ordinaryexperiences, just like Tim. Indeed, let’s assume that the mental statesof Tim and the mental states of Tim* are alike. But, since Tim* is abrain in a vat, he is, unlike Tim, radically deceived about his actualsituation. For example, when Tim believes he has hands, he is right.When Tim* believes he has hands, he is mistaken. (His hands werediscarded, along with the rest of his limbs and torso.) When Timbelieves he is drinking coffee, he is right. When Tim* believes he isdrinking coffee, he is mistaken. (Brains don’t drink coffee.) Nowsuppose Tim* asks himself whether he is justified in believing that hehas hands. Since Tim* is just like Tim, Tim* will say that his beliefis justified, just as Tim would if he were to ask himself whether he isjustified in believing that he has hands. Evidentialism implies thatTim*’s answer is correct. For even though he is deceived about hisexternal situation, he is not deceived about his evidence: the waythings appear to him in his experiences. This illustrates theinternality of evidentialist justification. Reliabilism, on the otherhand, suggests that Tim*’s answer is incorrect. Tim*’s belief that hehas hands originates in cognitive processes — ‘seeing’ and’feeling’ his (nonexisting) hands — that now yield virtually notrue beliefs. To the extent that this implies their unreliability, theresulting beliefs are unjustified. Consequently, he is deceived notonly about his external situation (his not having hands), but alsoabout the justificational status of his belief that he has hands. Thisillustrates the externality of reliabilist justification.

Cube world free. download full game. The example of Tim and Tim* may serve as well to illustrate afurther way in which we may conceive of the difference betweeninternalism and externalism. Some internalists take the followingprinciple to be characteristic of the internalist point of view:

Mentalism
If two subjects, S and S*, are alike mentally, thenthe justificational status of their beliefs is alike as well: the samebeliefs are justified or unjustified for them to the same extent.[29]

When we apply this principle to the Tim/Tim* example, it tells usthat evidentialism is an internalist and reliabilism an externalisttheory. Even though there are significant physical differences betweenTim and Tim*, mentally they are alike. Evidentialism implies that,since Tim and Tim* are mentally alike, they have the same evidence, andthus are justificationally alike as well. For example, they are bothjustified in believing that they have hands. This makes evidentialisman internalist theory. Reliabilism, on the other hand, allows that,even though Tim and Tim* are mentally alike, they differjustificationally, since Tim’s beliefs are (by and large) produced byreliable cognitive faculties, whereas the faculties that produce Tim*’sbeliefs may count as unreliable. For example, some versions ofreliabilism imply that Tim is justified in believing that he has hands,whereas Tim* is not. This makes reliabilism an externalist theory.[30]

2.4 Why Internalism?

Why think that justification is internal? One argument for theinternality of justification goes as follows: ‘Justification isdeontological: it is a matter of duty-fulfillment. But duty-fulfillmentis internal. Therefore, justification is internal.’ Another argumentappeals to the brain-in-the-vat scenario we considered above: ‘Tim*’sbelief that he has hands is justified in the way that Tim’s isjustifed. Tim* is internally the same as Tim and externally quitedifferent. Therefore, internal factors are what justify beliefs.’Finally, since justification resulting from the possession of evidenceis internal justification, internalism can be supported by way ofmaking a case for evidentialism. What, then, can be said in support ofevidentialism? Evidentialists would appeal to cases in which a beliefis reliably formed but not accompanied by any experiences that wouldqualify as evidence. They would say that it’s not plausible to claimthat, in cases like that, the subject’s belief is justified. Hence suchcases show, according to evidentialists, that a belief can’t bejustified unless it’s supported by evidence.[31]

2.5 Why Externalism?

Why think that justification is external? To begin with,externalists about justification would point to the fact that animalsand small children have knowledge and thus have justified beliefs. Buttheir beliefs can’t be justified in the way evidentialists conceive ofjustification. Therefore, we must conclude that the justification theirbeliefs enjoy is external: resulting not from the possession ofevidence but from origination in reliable processes. And second,externalists would say that what we want from justification is the kindof objective probability needed for knowledge, and only externalconditions on justification imply this probability. So justificationhas external conditions.[32]

3. The Structure of Knowledge and Justification

The debate over the structure of knowledge and justification isprimarily one among those who hold that knowledge requiresjustification. From this point of view, the structure of knowledgederives from the structure of justification. We will, therefore, focuson the latter.

3.1 Foundationalism

According to foundationalism, our justified beliefs are structured likea building: they are divided into a foundation and a superstructure,the latter resting upon the former. Beliefs belonging to the foundationare basic. Beliefs belonging to the superstructure arenonbasic and receive justification from the justified beliefsin the foundation.[33]

For a foundationalist account of justification to be plausible, itmust solve two problems. First, by virtue of exactly what are basicbeliefs justified? Second, how do basic beliefs justify nonbasicbeliefs? Before we address these questions, let us first consider thequestion of what it is that makes a justified belief basic in the firstplace. Once we have done that, we can then move on to discuss by virtueof what a basic belief might be justified, and how such a belief mightjustify a nonbasic belief.

According to one approach, what makes a justified belief basic isthat it doesn’t receive its justification from any other beliefs. Thefollowing definition captures this thought:

Doxastic Basicality (DB)
S’s justified belief that p is basic if and only ifS’s belief that p is justified without owing itsjustification to any of S’s other beliefs.

Let’s consider what would, according to DB, qualify as an example ofa basic belief. Suppose you notice (for whatever reason) someone’s hat,and you also notice that that hat looks blue to you. So you believe

(B) It appears to me that that hat is blue.

Unless something very strange is going on, (B) is an example of ajustified belief. DB tells us that (B) is basic if and only if it doesnot owe its justification to any other beliefs of yours. So if (B) isindeed basic, there might be some item or other to which (B) owes itsjustification, but that item would not be another belief of yours. Wecall this kind of basicality ‘doxastic’ because it makesbasicality a function of how your doxastic system (your belief system)is structured.

Let us turn to the question of where the justification that attachesto (B) might come from, if we think of basicality as defined by DB.Note that DB merely tells us how (B) is not justified. It saysnothing about how (B) is justified. DB, therefore, does notanswer that question. What we need, in addition to DB, is an account ofwhat it is that justifies a belief such as (B). According toone strand of foundationalist thought, (B) is justified because itcan’t be false, doubted, or corrected by others. So (B) is justifiedbecause (B) carries with it an epistemic privilege such asinfallibility, indubitability, or incorrigibility.[34] The idea is that (B)is justified by virtue of its intrinsic nature, which makes it possesssome kind of an epistemic privilege.

Note that (B) is not a belief about the hat. Rather, it’s a beliefabout how the hat appears to you. So (B) is an introspectivebelief about a perceptual experience of yours. According to the thoughtwe are considering here, a subject’s basic beliefs are made up ofintrospective beliefs about the subject’s own mental states, of whichperceptual experiences make up one subset. Other mental states aboutwhich a subject can have basic beliefs include such things as having aheadache, being tired, feeling pleasure, or having a desire for a cupof coffee. Beliefs about external objects do not and indeed cannotqualify as basic, for it is impossible for such beliefs to own the kindof epistemic privilege needed for the status of being basic.

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According to a different version of foundationalism, (B) isjustified not by virtue of possessing some kind of privileged status,but by some further mental state of yours. That mental state, however,is not a further belief of yours. Rather, it is the veryperceptual experience that (B) is about: the hat’s lookingblue to you. Let ‘(E)’ represent that experience. Accordingto this alternative proposal, (B) and (E) are distinct mental states.The idea is that what justifies (B) is (E). Since (E) is an experience,not a belief of yours, (B) is, according to DB, basic.

Let’s call the two versions of foundationalism we have distinguishedprivilege foundationalism and experientialfoundationalism. Privilege foundationalism restricts basic beliefsto beliefs about one’s own mental states. Experiential foundationalismis less restrictive. According to it, beliefs about external objectscan be basic as well. Suppose instead of (B), you believe

(H) That hat is blue.

Unlike (B), (H) is about the hat itself, and not the way the hatappears to you. Such a belief is not one about which we are infallibleor otherwise epistemically privileged. Privilege foundationalism would,therefore, classify (H) as nonbasic. It is, however, quite plausible tothink that (E) justifies not only (B) but (H) as well. If (E) is indeedwhat justifies (H), and (H) does not receive any additionaljustification from any further beliefs of yours, then (H) qualifies,according to DB, as basic.

Experiential Foundationalism, then, combines to two crucial ideas:(i) when a justified belief is basic, its justification is not owed toany other belief; (ii) what in fact justifies basic beliefs areexperiences.

Under ordinary circumstances, perceptual beliefs such as (H) are notbased on any further beliefs about one’s own perceptualexperiences. It is unclear, therefore, how privilege foundationalismcan account for the justification of ordinary perceptual beliefs like(H). Experiential foundationalism, on the other hand, has no trouble atall explaining how ordinary perceptual beliefs are justified: they arejustified by the perceptual experiences that give rise to them. Thiscould be viewed as a reason for preferring experiential foundationalismto privilege foundationalism.

Above, we noted that how to think of basicality is notuncontroversial. DB defines just one kind of basicality. Here’s analternative conception of it:

Epistemic Basicality (EB)
S’s justified belief that p is basic if and only ifS’s justification for believing that p does notdepend on any justification S possesses for believing afurther proposition, q.[35]

EB makes it more difficult for a belief to be basic than DB does. Tosee why, we turn to the chief question (let’s call it the‘J-question’) that advocates of experientialfoundationalism face:

The J-Question
Why are perceptual experiences a source of justification?

One way of answering the J-question can be viewed as acompromise position, since it is meant to be a compromisebetween foundationalism and its competitor, coherentism. The compromiseposition will be of interest to us because it illustrates how DB and EBdiffer. For if we adopt the compromise position, beliefs such as (H)will qualify as basic according to DB, but according to EB as nonbasic.So let’s see what the compromise position says.

From a coherentist point of view, we might answer the J-question asfollows: Perceptual experiences are a source of justification becausewe are justified in believing them to be reliable. As we willsee below, making perceptual justification dependent on the existenceof reliability-attributing beliefs is quite problematic. There is,however, an alternative answer to the J-question that appeals toreliability without making perceptual justification dependent uponbeliefs that attribute reliability to perceptual experiences. Accordingto this second answer to the J-question, perceptual experiences are asource of justification because we have justification for taking themto be reliable. That’s the view we shall call the compromise position.[36]

Note that your having justification for believing that pdoesn’t entail that you actually believe p. For example, ifyou believe that the person next to you wears a blue hat, you havejustification for believing that the person next to you wears a bluehat or a red hat. But of course you are unlikely to believe the lattereven though you have justification for it. Likewise, your havingjustification for attributing reliability to your perceptualexperiences doesn’t entail that you have given thought to the matterand actually formed the belief that they are reliable. According to thekind of coherentism we considered above, if your perceptual experiencesare a source of justification for you, it must be the case that youhave considered the matter and believe them to be reliable.The compromise position says no such thing. It says merely that, ifyour perceptual experiences are a source of justification for you, youmust have justification for believing them to be reliable.

What might give us justification for thinking that our perceptualexperiences are reliable? That’s a complicated issue. For our presentpurposes, let’s consider the following answer: We remember that theyhave served us well in the past. We are supposing, then, thatjustification for attributing reliability to your perceptualexperiences consists of memories of perceptual success. According tothe compromise position, it is never a perceptual experience (E) byitself that justifies a perceptual belief, but only (E) inconjunction with suitable track-record memories that give youjustification for considering (E) reliable. Let ‘(E)’ againstand for the hat’s looking blue to you, and ‘(H)’ for yourbelief that that hat is blue. According to the compromise position, (E)justifies (H) only if (E) is accompanied by track-record memories (M)that give you justification for attributing reliability to your visualexperiences. So what, according to the compromise position as we havedescribed it, justifies (H) is the conjunction of (E) and (M).

We can now see how DB and EB differ. According to the compromiseposition, your having justification for (H) depends on your havingjustification for believing something else in addition to (H), namelythat your visual experiences are reliable. As a result (H) is not basicin the sense defined by EB. However, (H) might still be basic in thesense defined by DB. As long as your justification for (H) is owedsolely to (E) and (M), neither of which includes any beliefs,DB tells us that (H) is basic. It follows that an experientialfoundationalist who wishes to classify beliefs such as (H) as basiccannot adopt the compromise position. Such a foundationalist would haveto say that (E) by itself is sufficient for making (H) a justifiedbelief.

How do experiential foundationalists who prefer EB to DB answer theJ-question? Because of the way they conceive of basicality, they cannotsay that perceptual experiences are a source of justification for youbecause you have a reason, R, for believing that they do. ForR would be justification for believing something else — the very thing that, according to EB, is an obstacle to basicality. Oneoption for EB-foundationalists would be to endorse externalism. If theydo, they could say that perceptual experiences are a source ofjustification if, and only if, they are of types that are reliablyassociated with true resulting beliefs. On that view, it would be thefact of reliability, not evidence of reliability, that makes perceptualexperiences a source of justification.[37] Another internalistoption would be to say that perceptual experiences are a source ofjustification because it couldn’t be otherwise: it’s a necessarytruth that certain perceptual experiences can justify certainperceptual beliefs. This would be an internalist answer to theJ-question because perceptual experiences would be a source ofjustification whether or not they are reliable.[38]

To conclude this section, let us briefly consider how justificationis supposed to be transferred from basic to nonbasic beliefs. There aretwo options: the justificatory relation between basic and nonbasicbeliefs could be deductive or non-deductive. If we take the relation tobe deductive, each of one’s nonbasic beliefs would have to be such thatit can be deduced from one’s basic beliefs. This seems excessivelydemanding. If we consider a random selection of typical beliefs wehold, it is not easy to see from which basic beliefs they could bededuced. Foundationalists, therefore, typically conceive of the linkbetween the foundation and the superstructure in non-deductive terms.They would say that, for a basic belief, B, to justify a nonbasicbelief, B*, it isn’t necessary that B entails B*. Rather, it issufficient that, given B, it is likely that B* is true.

3.2 Coherentism

Foundationalism says that knowledge and justification are structuredlike a building, consisting of a superstructure that rests upon afoundation. According to coherentism, this metaphor gets things wrong.Knowledge and justification are structured like a web wherethe strength of any given area depends on the strength of thesurrounding areas. Coherentists, then, deny that there are any basicbeliefs. As we saw in the previous section, there are two differentways of conceiving of basicality. Consequently, there are twocorresponding ways of construing coherentism: as the denial of doxasticbasicality or as the denial of epistemic basicality. Consider firstcoherentism as the denial of doxastic basicality:

Doxastic Coherentism
Every justified belief receives its justification from other beliefsin its epistemic neighborhood.

Let us apply this thought to the hat example we considered inSection 3.1. Suppose again you notice someone’s hat and believe

(H) That hat is blue.

Let’s agree that (H) is justified. According to coherentism, (H)receives its justification from other beliefs in the epistemic vicinityof (H). They constitute your evidence or your reasons for taking (H) tobe true. Which beliefs might make up this set ofjustification-conferring neighborhood beliefs?

We will consider two approaches to answering this question. Thefirst is known as inference to the best explanation. Suchinferences generate what is called explanatory coherence.[39] According to this approach, we mustsuppose you form a belief about the way the hat appears to you in yourperceptual experiences, and a second belief to the effect that yourperceptual experience, the hat’s looking blue to you, is best explainedby the assumption that (H) is true. So the relevant set of beliefs isthe following:

(1) I am having a visual experience (E): the hat looks blueto me.

(2) My having (E) is best explained by assuming that (H) istrue.

There are of course alternative explanations of why you have (E).Perhaps you are hallucinating that the hat is blue. Perhaps an evildemon makes the hat look blue to you when in fact it is red. Perhapsyou are the sort of person to whom hats always look blue. Anexplanatory coherentist would say that, compared with these, the hat’sactual blueness is a superior explanation. That’s why you arejustified in believing (H). Note that an explanatory coherentist canalso explain the lack of justification. Suppose you rememberthat you just took a hallucinatory drug that makes things look blue toyou. That would prevent you from being justified in believing (H). Theexplanatory coherentist can account for this by pointing out that, inthe case we are considering now, the truth of (H) would not be thebest explanation of why you are having experience (E). Rather,your having taken the hallucinatory drug would be an explanation atleast as good as the assumption as (H) is true. That’s why, accordingto the explanatory coherentist, in this variation of our original caseyou wouldn’t be justified in believing (H).

One problem for explanatory coherentists is to make us understand,in nonepistemic terms, why the favored explanation is reallybetter than the competing explanations. Let’s use the evil demonhypothesis to illustrate that difficulty. What we need is anexplanation of why you are having (E). According to the evil demonhypothesis, you are having (E) because the evil demon is tricking you.The explanatory coherentist would say that this is a bad explanation ofwhy you are having (E). But why would it be bad? What we need to answerthis question is a general and principled account of what makes oneexplanation better than another. Suppose we appeal to the fact that youare not justified in believing in the existence of evildemons. The general idea would be this: If there are two competingexplanations, E1 and E2, and E1 consists of or includes a propositionthat you are not justified in believing whereas E2 does not, then E2 isbetter than E1. The problem with this idea is that it puts the cartbefore the horse. Explanatory coherentism is supposed to make usunderstand where justification comes from. It doesn’t do that if itaccounts for the difference between better and worse explanations bymaking use of the difference between justified and unjustified belief.If explanatory coherentism were to proceed in this way, it would be acircular, and thus uninformative, account of justification. So thechallenge to which explanatory coherentism must rise is to give anaccount, without using the concept of justification, of what makes oneexplanation better than another.

Let us move on to the second way in which the coherentist approachmight be carried out. Recall what a subject’s justification forbelieving p is all about: possessing a link between the beliefthat p and p’s truth. Suppose the subject knows thatthe origin of her belief that p is reliable. So she knows thatbeliefs coming from this source tend to be true. Such knowledge wouldgive her an excellent link between the belief and its truth. So wemight say that the neighborhood beliefs which confer justification on(H) are the following:

(1) I am having a visual experience (E): the hat looks blueto me.

(3) Experiences like (E) are reliable.

Call coherentism of this kind reliability coherentism. Ifyou believe (1) and (3), you are in possession of a good reason forthinking that the hat is indeed blue. So you are in possession of agood reason for thinking that the belief in question, (H), is true.That’s why, according to reliability coherentism, you are justified inbelieving (H).

Like explanatory coherentism, this view faces a circularity problem.If (H) receives its justification in part because you also believe (3),(3) itself must be justified. But where would your justification for(3) come from? One answer would be: from your memory of perceptualsuccess in the past. You remember that your visual experiences have hada good track record. They have rarely led you astray. The problem isthat you can’t justifiably attribute a good track record to yourperceptual faculties without using your perceptual faculties. So ifreliability coherentism is going to work, it would have to belegitimate to use a faculty for the very purpose of establishing thereliability of that faculty itself. Some epistemologists think thatwould not be legitimate.[40]

We have seen that explanatory coherentism and reliabilitycoherentism each face its own distinctive circularity problem. Sinceboth are versions of doxastic coherentism, they both face afurther difficulty: Do people, under normal circumstances, really formbeliefs like (1), (2), and (3)? It would seem they do not. It could beobjected, therefore, that these two versions of coherentism makeexcessive intellectual demands of ordinary subjects who are unlikely tohave the background beliefs that, according to these versions ofcoherentism, are needed for justification. This objection could beavoided by stripping coherentism of its doxastic element. The resultwould be the following version of coherentism, which results fromrejecting EB (the epistemic conception of basicality):

Dependence Coherentism
Whenever one is justified in believing a propositionp1, one’s justification for believingp1 depends on justification one has for believingsome further propositions, p1,p2, …pn.

An explanatory coherentist might say that, for you to be justifiedin believing (H), it’s not necessary that you actually believe(1) and (2). However, it is necessary that you havejustification for believing (1) and (2). It is your havingjustification for (1) and (2) that gives you justification forbelieving (H). A reliability coherentist might make an analogous point.She might say that, to be justified in believing (H), you need notbelieve anything about the reliability of your belief’s origin. Youmust, however, have justification for believing that your belief’sorigin is reliable; that is, you must have justification for (1) and(3). Both versions of dependence coherentism, then, rest on thesupposition that it is possible to have justification for a propositionwithout actually believing that proposition.

Dependence coherentism is a significant departure from the waycoherentism has typically been construed by its advocates. According tothe typical construal of coherentism, the view says that a given beliefis justified, the subject must have certain further beliefsthat constitute reasons for the given belief. Dependence coherentismrejects this. According to it, justification need not come in the formof beliefs. It can come in the form of introspective and memorialevidence that gives a subject justification for beliefs about eitherreliability or explanatory coherence. In fact, dependence coherentismallows for the possibility that a belief is justified, not by receivingany of its justification from other beliefs, but solely bysuitable perceptual experiences and memory content. Above, we calledthis view the ‘compromise position’. The compromise position, then, maybe characterized as follows:

1. it allows for doxastic basicality;
2. it does not allow for epistemic basicality;
3. it is inconsistent with doxastic coherentism;
4. it qualifies as a version of coherentism, namely dependencecoherentism.

Note that (iii) follows from (i), and (iv) from (ii). Anuncompromising foundationalist would reject dependence coherentism. Afoundationalist of that kind views a basic belief that p as abelief whose justification does not depend on having anyjustification for believing another proposition q.Foundationalism of this sort could be called independencefoundationalism, since it asserts that a basic belief’sjustification is completely independent of having justification for anyother beliefs. The logic of the conflict between foundationalism andcoherentism seems to suggest that, ultimately, the conflict between thetwo views boils down to that between dependence coherentism andindependence foundationalism.[41]

Next, let us examine the reasons for and against in the debate overfoundationalism and coherentism.

3.3 Why Foundationalism?

The main argument for foundationalism is called the regressargument. It’s an argument from elimination. With regard to everyjustified belief, B1, the question arises of whereB1’s justification comes from. If B1 is notbasic, it would have to come from another belief, B2. ButB2 can justify B1 only if B2 isjustified itself. If B2 is basic, the justificatory chainwould end with B2. But if B2 is not basic, weneed a further belief, B3. If B3 is not basic, weneed a fourth belief, and so forth. Unless the ensuing regressterminates in a basic belief, we get two possibilities: the regresswill either loop back to B1 or continue adinfinitum. According to the regress argument, both of thesepossibilities are unacceptable. Therefore, if there are justifiedbeliefs, there must be basic beliefs.[42]

This argument suffers from various weaknesses. First, we may wonderwhether the alternatives to foundationalism are really unacceptable. Inthe recent literature on this subject, we actually find an elaboratedefense of the position that infinitism is the correct solution to theregress problem.[43] Nor should circularity be dismissed tooquickly. The issue is not whether a simple argument of the form ptherefore p is acceptable. Of course it is not. Rather, the issueis ultimately whether, in the attempt to show that trust in ourfaculties is reasonable, we may make use of the input our facultiesdeliver. Whether such circularity is as unacceptable as ap-therefore-p inference is an open question. Moreover, theavoidance of circularity does not come cheap. Experientialfoundationalists claim that perception is a source of justification.Hence they need to answer the J-question: Why is perception asource of justification? As we saw above, if we wish to answer thisquestion without committing ourselves to the kind of circularitydependence coherentism involves, we must choose between externalism andan appeal to brute necessity. Neither choice is unproblematic.

The second weakness of the regress argument is that its conclusionmerely says this: If there are justified beliefs, there must bejustified beliefs that do not receive their justification from otherbeliefs. Its conclusion does not say that, if there are justifiedbeliefs, there must be beliefs whose justification is independent ofany justification for further beliefs. So the regress argument, if itwere sound, would merely show that there must be doxasticbasicality. Dependence coherentism, however, allows for doxasticbasicality. So the regress argument merely defends experientialfoundationalism against doxastic coherentism. It does not tell us whywe should prefer independence foundationalism to dependencecoherentism.

Experiential foundationalism can be supported by citing cases likethe blue hat example. Such examples make it plausible to assume thatperceptual experiences are a source of justification. But they do notarbitrate between dependence coherentism and independencefoundationalism, since either one of these views appeals to perceptualexperiences to explain why perceptual beliefs are justified.

Finally, foundationalism can be supported by advancing objections tocoherentism. One prominent objection is that coherentism somehow failsto ensure that a justified belief system is in contact with reality.This objection derives its force from the fact that fiction can beperfectly coherent. Why think, therefore, that a belief system’scoherence is a reason for thinking that the belief in that system tendto be true? Coherentists could respond to this objection by sayingthat, if a belief system contains beliefs such as ‘Many of my beliefshave their origin in perceptual experiences’ and ‘My perceptualexperiences are reliable’, it is reasonable for the subject to thinkthat her belief system brings her into contact with external reality.This looks like an effective response to the no-contact-with-realityobjection. Moreover, it is not easy to see why foundationalism itselfshould be better positioned than coherentism when contact with realityis the issue. What is meant by ‘ensuring’ contact with reality? Iffoundationalists expect a logical guarantee of such contact,basic beliefs must be infallible. That would make contact with realitya rather expensive commodity. Given its price, foundationalists mightwant to lower their expectations. According to an alternativeconstrual, we expect merely the likelihood of contact withreality. But if coherentists account for the importance of perceptionin one way or another, they can meet that expectation as well asfoundationalists.

Since coherentism can be construed in different ways, it is unlikelythat there is one single objection that succeeds in refuting allpossible versions of coherentism. Doxastic coherentism, however, seemsparticularly vulnerable to criticism coming from the foundationalistcamp. One of these we considered already: It would seem that doxasticcoherentism makes excessive intellectual demands on believers. Whendealing with the mundane tasks of everyday life, we don’t normallybother to form beliefs about the explanatory coherence of our beliefsor the reliability of our belief sources. According to a secondobjection, doxastic coherentism fails by being insensitive to theepistemic relevance of perceptual experiences. Foundationalists couldargue as follows. Suppose Kim is observing a chameleon that rapidlychanges its colors. A moment ago it was blue, now it’s purple. Kimstill believes it’s blue. Her belief is now unjustified because shebelieves the chameleon is blue even though it looks purple toher. Then the chameleon changes its color back to blue. Now Kim’sbelief that the chameleon is blue is justified again because thechameleon once again looks blue to her. The point would bethat what’s responsible for the changing justificatory status of Kim’sbelief is solely the way the chameleon looks to her. Since doxasticcoherentism does not attribute epistemic relevance to perceptualexperiences by themselves, it cannot explain why Kim’s belief is firstjustified, then unjustified, and eventually justified again.[44]

3.4 Why Coherentism?

Coherentism is typically defended by attacking foundationalism as aviable alternative. To argue against privilege foundationalism,coherentists pick an epistemic privilege they think is essential tofoundationalism, and then argue that either no beliefs, or too fewbeliefs, enjoy such a privilege. Against experiential foundationalism,different objections have been advanced. One line of criticism is thatperceptual experiences don’t have propositional content. Therefore, therelation between a perceptual belief and the perceptual experience thatgives rise to it can only be causal. Consider again, however, the hatexample from above. When you see the hat and it looks blue to you,doesn’t your visual experience — its looking blue to you — have the propositional content that the hat is blue? It wouldseem it does. If it does, there seems to be no reason to deny that yourperceptual experience can play a justificatory role.[45]

Another line of thought is that, if perceptual experiences havepropositional content, they cannot stop the justificatory regressbecause they would then be in need of justification themselves. That,however, appears to be a strange thought. In our actual epistemicpractice, we never demand of others to justify the way things appear tothem in their perceptual experiences. Indeed, such a demand would seemabsurd. Suppose I ask you: ‘Why do you think that the hat is blue?’ Youanswer: ‘Because it looks blue to me.’ There are sensible furtherquestions I might ask at that point. For instance, I might ask: ‘Why doyou think its looking blue to you gives you a reason for thinking it isblue?’ Or I might ask: ‘Couldn’t you be mistaken in believing it looksblue to you?’ The latter question might irritate you, but it would notbe illegitimate. After all, we can reasonably doubt that introspectivebeliefs about how things appear to us are infallible. But now suppose Iask you: ‘Why do you suppose the perceptual experience in which the hatlooks blue to you is justified?’ In response to that question, youshould accuse me of misusing the word ‘justification’. Imight as well ask you what it is that justifies your headache when youhave one, or what justifies the itch in your nose when you have one.The latter questions, you should reply, would be as absurd as myrequest for stating a justifying reason for your perceptual experience.[46]

Experiential foundationalism, then, is not easily dislodged. On whatgrounds could coherentists object to it? To raise problems forexperiential foundationalism, coherentists could press the J-question:Why are perceptual experiences a source of justification? Iffoundationalists answer the J-question appealing to evidence thatwarrants the attribution of reliability to perceptual experiences,experiential foundationalism morphs into dependence coherentism, or, aswe have called it, the compromise position. To avoid this outcome,foundationalists would have to give an alternative answer. One way ofdoing this would be to advocate independence foundationalism, whichadopts the epistemic conception of basicality and views it as a matterof brute necessity that perception is a source of justification. Soultimately, the task of defending coherentism might come down to thetask of showing that dependence coherentism as a compromise position ispreferable to independence foundationalism. To back up such apreference, it might be argued that dependence coherentism gives us amore satisfying answer to the J-question than independencefoundationalism does. But is that really so?

Suppose we ask ‘Why is the sum of two and two four?’ Isn’t theanswer ‘It couldn’t be any other way’ perfectly satisfactory? Sosometimes, at least, a request for explaining the truth of pis met in a satisfying way by pointing out that p isnecessarily true. Why, then, should we not be satisfied whenindependence foundationalists answer the J-question by saying thatperceptual experiences are necessarily a source ofjustification? To find out whether we should be satisfied, we mightemploy thought experiments. We might try to describe a possible worldin which, to use our example again, someone sees an object that looksblue to her, but the object’s looking blue to her does not give her anyjustification at all for believing that the object is actually blue. Ifwe can conceive of such a possible world, then we have reason to thinkthat independence foundationalists are mistaken when they say thatperceptual experience is necessarily a source of justification.

4. Sources of Knowledge and Justification

Beliefs arise in people for a wide variety of causes. Among them, wemust list psychological factors such as desires, emotional needs,prejudice, and biases of various kinds. Obviously, when beliefsoriginate in sources like these, they don’t qualify as knowledge evenif true. For true beliefs to count as knowledge, it is necessary thatthey originate in sources we have good reason to consider reliable.These are perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony. Letus briefly consider each of these.

4.1 Perception

Our perceptual faculties are our five senses: sight, touch, hearing,smelling, and tasting. We must distinguish between an experience thatcan be classified as perceiving that p (for example,seeing that there is coffee in the cup and tasting that it is sweet),which entails that p is true, and a perceptual experience inwhich it seems to us as though p, but where p mightbe false. Let us refer to this latter kind of experience asperceptual seemings. The reason for making this distinctionlies in the fact that perceptual experience is fallible. The world isnot always as it appears to us in our perceptual experiences. We need,therefore, a way of referring to perceptual experiences in whichp seems to be the case that allows for the possibility ofp being false. That’s the role assigned to perceptualseemings. So some perceptual seemings that p are cases ofperceiving that p, others are not. When it looks to you asthough there is a cup of coffee on the table and in fact there is, thetwo states coincide. If, however, you hallucinate that there is a cupon the table, you have perceptual seeming that p withoutperceiving that p.

One family of epistemological issues about perception arises when weconcern ourselves with the psychological nature of the perceptualprocesses through which we acquire knowledge of external objects.According to direct realism, we can acquire such knowledgebecause we can directly perceive such objects. For example, when yousee a tomato on the table, what you perceive is the tomatoitself. According to indirect realism, we acquire knowledge ofexternal objects by virtue of perceiving something else, namelyappearances or sense-data. An indirect realist would say that, when yousee and thus know that there is a tomato on the table, what you reallysee is not the tomato itself but a tomato-like sense-datum or some suchentity.

Direct and indirect realists hold different views about thestructure of perceptual knowledge. Indirect realists would say that weacquire perceptual knowledge of external objects by virtue ofperceiving sense data that represent external objects. Sense data, aspecies of mental states, enjoy a special status: we know directly whatthey are like. So indirect realists think that, when perceptualknowledge is foundational, it is knowledge of sense data and othermental states. Knowledge of external objects is indirect: derived fromour knowledge of sense data. The basic idea is that we have indirectknowledge of the external world because we can have foundationalknowledge of our own mind. Direct realists can be more liberal aboutthe foundation of our knowledge of external objects. Since they holdthat perceptual experiences get you in direct contact with externalobjects, they can say that such experiences can give you foundationalknowledge of external objects.

We take our perceptual faculties to be reliable. But how can we knowthat they are reliable? For externalists, this might not be much of achallenge. If the use of reliable faculties is sufficient forknowledge, and if by using reliable faculties we acquire the beliefthat our faculties are reliable, then we come to know that ourfaculties are reliable. But even externalists might wonder how theycan, via argument, show that our perceptual faculties arereliable. The problem is this. It would seem the only way of acquiringknowledge about the reliability of our perceptual faculties is throughmemory, through remembering whether they served us well in the past.But should I trust my memory, and should I think that the episodes ofperceptual success that I seem to recall were in fact episodes ofperceptual success? If I am entitled to answer these questions with‘yes’, then I need to have, to begin with, reason to view mymemory and my perceptual experiences as reliable. It would seem,therefore, that there is no non-circular way of arguing for thereliability of one’s perceptual faculties.[47]

4.2 Introspection

Introspection is the capacity to inspect the, metaphoricallyspeaking, ‘inside’ of one’s mind. Through introspection, one knows whatmental states one is in: whether one is thirsty, tired, excited, ordepressed. Compared with perception, introspection appears to have aspecial status. It is easy to see how a perceptual seeming can gowrong: what looks like a cup of coffee on the table might be just be aclever hologram that’s visually indistinguishable from an actual cup ofcoffee. But could it be possible that it introspectively seems to methat I have a headache when in fact I do not? It is not easy to see howit could be. Thus we come to think that introspection has a specialstatus. Compared with perception, introspection seems to be privilegedby virtue of being less error prone. How can we account for the specialstatus of introspection?

First, it could be argued that, when it comes to introspection,there is no difference between appearance and reality; therefore,introspective seemings are necessarily successful introspections.According to this approach, introspection is infallible. Alternatively,one could view introspection as a source of certainty. Here the idea isthat an introspective experience of p eliminates all possibledoubt as to whether p is true. Finally, one could attempt toexplain the specialness of introspection by examining the way werespond to first-person reports: typically, we attribute a specialauthority to such reports. According to this approach, introspection isincorrigible. Others are not, or at least not typically, in a positionto correct first-person reports of one’s own mental states.

Introspection reveals how the world appears to us in our perceptualexperiences. For that reason, introspection has been of specialinterest to foundationalists. Perception is not immune to error. Ifcertainty consists in the absence of all possible doubt, perceptionfails to yield certainty. Hence beliefs based on perceptual experiencescannot be foundational. Introspection, however, might deliver what weneed to find a firm foundation for our beliefs about external objects:at best outright immunity to error or all possible doubt, or perhapsmore modestly, an epistemic kind of directness that cannot be found inperception.

Is it really true, however, that, compared with perception,introspection is in some way special? Critics of foundationalism haveargued that introspection is certainly not infallible. Might one notconfuse an unpleasant itch for a pain? Might I not think that the shapebefore me appears circular to me when in fact it appears slightlyelliptical to me? If it is indeed possible for introspection tomislead, then it is hard to see why introspection should eliminate allpossible doubt. Yet it isn’t easy to see either how, if one clearly anddistinctly feels a throbbing headache, one could be mistaken aboutthat. Introspection, then, turns out to be a mysterious faculty. On theone hand, it does not seem to be in general an infallible faculty; onthe other hand, when looking at appropriately described specific cases,error does seem impossible.[48]

4.3 Memory

Introduction To Contemporary Epistemology Pdf

Memory is the capacity to retain knowledge acquired in the past. Whatone remembers, though, need not be a past event. It may be a presentfact, such as one’s telephone number, or a future event, such as thedate of the next elections. Memory is, of course, fallible. Not everyinstance of taking oneself to remember that p is an instanceof actually remembering that p. We should distinguish,therefore, between remembering that p (which entails the truthof p) and seeming to remember that p (whichdoes not entail the truth of p).

One issue about memory concerns the question of what distinguishesmemorial seemings from perceptual seemings or mere imagination. Somephilosophers have thought that having an image in one’s mind isessential to memory, but that would appear to be mistaken. When oneremembers one’s telephone number, one is unlikely to have an image ofone’s number in one’s mind. The distinctively epistemological questionsabout memory are these: First, what makes memorial seemings a source ofjustification? Is it a necessary truth that, if one has a memorialseeming that p, one has thereby prima facie justification forp? Or is memory a source of justification only if, ascoherentists might say, one has reason to think that one’s memory isreliable? Or is memory a source of justification only if, asexternalists would say, it is in fact reliable? Second, how can werespond to skepticism about knowledge of the past? Memorial seemings ofthe past do not guarantee that the past is what we take it to be. Wethink that we are a bit older than just five minutes, but it islogically possible that the world sprang into existence just fiveminutes ago, complete with our dispositions to have memorial seemingsof a more distant past and items such as apparent fossils that suggesta past going back millions of years. Our seeming to remember that theworld is older than a mere five minutes does not entail, therefore,that it really is. Why, then, should we think that memory is a sourceof knowledge about the past?[49]

4.4 Reason

Some beliefs would appear to be justified solely by the use ofreason. Justification of that kind is said to be apriori: prior to any kind of experience. A standard way ofdefining a priori justification goes as follows:

A Priori Justification
S is justified a priori in believing that pif and only if S’s justification for believing that pdoes not depend on any experience.

Beliefs that are true and justified in this way (and not somehow’gettiered’) would count as instances of a priori knowledge.[50]

What exactly counts as experience? If by ‘experience’ wemean just perceptual experiences, justification deriving fromintrospective or memorial experiences would count as a priori.For example, I could then know a priori that I’m thirsty, orwhat I ate for breakfast this morning. While the term ‘apriori’ is sometimes used in this way, the strict use of theterm restricts a priori justification to justification derivedsolely from the use of reason. According to this usage, theword ‘experiences’ in the definition above includes perceptual,introspective, and memorial experiences alike. On this narrowerunderstanding, paradigm examples of what I can know on the basis ofa priori justification are conceptual truths (such as ‘Allbachelors are unmarried’), and truths of mathematics, geometry andlogic.

Justification and knowledge that is not a priori is called‘a posteriori’ or ‘empirical’. For example, inthe narrow sense of ‘a priori’, whether I’mthirsty or not is something I know empirically (on the basis ofintrospective experiences), whereas I know a priori that 12divided by 3 is 4.

Several important issues arise about a priori knowledge.First, does it exist at all? Skeptics about apriority deny itsexistence. They don’t mean to say that we have no knowledge ofmathematics, geometry, logic, and conceptual truths. Rather, what theyclaim is that all such knowledge is empirical.

Second, if a priori justification is possible, exactly howdoes it come about? What makes a belief such as ‘All bachelorsare unmarried’ justified solely on the basis of reason? Is it anunmediated grasp of the truth of this proposition? Or does it consistof grasping that the proposition is necessarily true? Or is itthe purely intellectual experience of ‘seeing’ (with they ‘eye ofreason’) or ‘intuiting’ that this proposition is true (or necessarilytrue)? Or is it, as externalists would suggest, the reliability of thecognitive process by which we come to recognize the truth of such aproposition?

Third, if a priori knowledge exists, what is its extent?Empiricists have argued that a priori knowledge islimited to the realm of the analytic, consisting ofpropositions of a somehow inferior status because they are not really’about the world’. Propositions of a superior status, which conveygenuine information about world, are labeled synthetic. apriori knowledge of synthetic propositions, empiricists would say,is not possible. Rationalists deny this. They would say that aproposition such as ‘If a ball is green all over, then it doesn’t haveblack spots’ is synthetic and knowable a priori.

A fourth question about the nature of a priori knowledgeconcerns the distinction between necessary and contingent truths. Thereceived view is that whatever is known a priori isnecessarily true, but there are epistemologists who disagree with that.[51]

4.5 Testimony

Testimony differs from the sources we considered above because itisn’t distinguished by having its own cognitive faculty. Rather, toacquire knowledge of p through testimony is to come to knowthat p on the basis of someone’s saying that p.’Saying that p’ must be understood broadly, as includingordinary utterances in daily life, postings by bloggers on theirweb-logs, articles by journalists, delivery of information ontelevision, radio, tapes, books, and other media. So, when you ask theperson next to you what time it is, and she tells you, and you therebycome to know what time it is, that’s an example of coming to knowsomething on the basis of testimony. And when you learn by reading theWashington Post that the terrorist attack in Sharm el-Sheikhof July 22, 2005 killed at least 88 people, that, too, is an example ofacquiring knowledge on the basis of testimony.

The epistemological puzzle testimony raises is this: Why istestimony a source of knowledge? An externalist might say thattestimony is a source of knowledge if and only if it comes from areliable source. But here, even more so than in the case of ourfaculties, internalists will not find that answer satisfactory. Supposeyou hear someone saying ‘p’. Suppose further thatperson is in fact utterly reliable with regard to the question ofwhether p is the case or not. Finally, suppose you have noevidential clue whatever as to that person’s reliability. Wouldn’t itbe plausible to conclude that, since that person’s reliability isunknown to you, that person’s saying ‘p’ does notput you in a position to know that p? But if the reliabilityof a testimonial source is not sufficient for making it a source ofknowledge, what else is needed? Thomas Reid suggested that, by our verynature, we accept testimonial sources as reliable and tend to attributecredibility to them unless we encounter special contrary reasons. Butthat’s merely a statement of the attitude we in fact take towardtestimony. What is it that makes that attitude reasonable? It could beargued that, in one’s own personal experiences with testimonialsources, one has accumulated a long track record that can be taken as asign of reliability. However, when we think of the sheer breadth of theknowledge we derive from testimony, one wonders whether one’s personalexperiences constitute an evidence base rich enough to justify theattribution of reliability to the totality of the testimonial sourcesone tends to trust. An alternative to the track record approach wouldbe to declare it a necessary truth that trust in testimonial sources isjustified. This suggestion, alas, encounters the same difficulty as theexternalist approach to testimony: it does not seem we can acquireknowledge from sources the reliability of which is utterly unknown to us.[52] Monster hunter 3rd iso.

5. The Limits of Knowledge and Justification

5.1 The Case for Skepticism

According to skeptics, the limits of what you know are narrower thanyou would like to think. There are many things that you think you knowbut actually fail to know. For example, you think you know that youhave hands, but in fact you don’t. How can the skeptics expect you totake such a strange conclusion seriously? Here’s how. As a first step,the skeptics will focus on another proposition, about which you arelikely to agree that you don’t know it. As a second step, they will getyou to agree that, since you don’t know that second proposition, youdon’t know the first one either: the proposition that you have hands.

When the skeptics get their argument started with some otherproposition about which you are likely to agree you don’t know it, whatdo they have in mind? They direct your attention to what is called askeptical hypothesis. According to a skeptical hypothesis,things are radically different from what you take them to be. Here areseveral examples:

• I’m lying in my bed dreaming.
• I’m deceived by an evil demon.
• I’m a mere brain-in-a-vat (a BIV).
• I’m in the matrix world.

What the skeptics will point out, and what they think you willeasily agree with, is this: For any particular hypothesis on the list,you don’t know that it is false. This works better for some than forothers. It works really well for the BIV hypothesis, which we discussedalready in section 2.2. The idea is that, if you are a BIV, you arereduced to a mere brain which is stimulated in such a way that thedelusion of a normal life results. So the experiences you have as a BIVand the experiences you have as a normal person are perfectly alike,indistinguishable, so to speak, ‘from the inside.’ It doesn’tlook to you as though you are a BIV. After all, you can seethat you have a body, and you can freely move about in yourenvironment. The problem is that it looks that way to a BIV, too. As aresult, the evidence you have as a normal person and the evidence youhave as a BIV do not relevantly differ. Consequently, your evidencecan’t settle the question of whether or not you are a BIV. Based onthis thought, the skeptics claim you don’t know that you arenot a BIV. That’s the first step of the case for skepticism.

Let us now focus on the second step. The basic thought is that, ifyou don’t know you’re not a BIV, you don’t know you have hands. Thatthought is extremely plausible. After all, if you are a BIV, you don’thave any hands. So if you can’t distinguish between being and not beinga BIV, you can’t distinguish either between having and not havinghands. But if you can’t distinguish between having and not havinghands, surely you don’t know that you have hands. Putting the two stepsof the skeptic’s reasoning together, we get the following argument:

The BIV Argument
(1) I don’t know that I’m not a BIV.(2) If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I havehands. Therefore:(3) I don’t know that I have hands.

As we have just seen, (1) and (2) are very plausible premises. Itwould seem, therefore, that the BIV Argument is sound. If it is, wemust conclude we don’t know we have hands. But surely that conclusioncan’t be right. So we are confronted with a difficult challenge: Onwhat grounds can we reject the conclusion of this seemingly sound argument?[53]

5.2 Skepticism and Closure

The second premise is closely connected to the principle thatknowledge is closed under known entailment, for short, the closureprinciple. Setting complications aside, it says the following:

The Closure Principle
If I know that p, and I know that p entailsq, then I know that q.[54]

This principle is exceedingly plausible. Here’s an example toillustrate it. Suppose you had exactly two beers. Your having hadexactly two beers entails that you had less than three beers. If youknow both of these things, then you know that you had less than threebeers. This much, certainly, seems beyond dispute.

How is the closure principle related to the skeptical argument? Theconnection can be seen when you replace ‘p’ and‘q’ with the relevant propositions:

p: I have hands.
q: I’m not a BIV.

Making these replacements, we get the following application of theclosure principle to the BIV argument:

BIV Closure
If I know that I have hands, and I know that my having hands entailsmy not being a BIV, then I know that I’m not a BIV.

According to the skeptical argument, you can’t know that you are nota BIV. So the consequent of BIV closure is false. Therefore, theantecedent of BIV closure must be false. The antecedent of BIV closureis a conjunction. The second conjunct can’t be argued with. If youunderstand what is meant by the BIV hypothesis, then you know that youdon’t have hands if you are a BIV. If follows that the antecedent ofBIV Closure is false because its first conjunct is false. Sostarting out with the closure principle, we arrive at the skepticalconclusion: You don’t know that you have hands.[55]

5.3 Relevant Alternatives and Closure Denial

Next, we will examine various responses to the BIV argument.According to the first, we should distinguish between relevant andirrelevant alternatives. An alternative to a state of affairs orproposition p is any state of affairs or proposition that isincompatible with p. Your having hands and your being a BIVare alternatives: if the former is true, the latter is false, and viceversa. According to the thought that motivates the second premise ofthe BIV argument, you know that you have hands only if you candiscriminate between your actually having hands and the alternative ofbeing a (handless) BIV. But you can’t discriminate between these twostates of affairs. That’s why you don’t know that you have hands. Inresponse to such reasoning, a relevant alternatives theorist would saythat your inability to discriminate between these two states of affairsis not an obstacle to your knowing that you have hands because yourbeing a BIV is not a relevant alternative to yourhaving hands. What would be a relevant alternative? This, for example:your arms ending in stumps rather than hands, or your having hooksinstead of hands, or your having prosthetic hands. But thesealternatives don’t prevent you from knowing that you have hands — not because they are irrelevant, but rather because you candiscriminate between these alternatives and your having hands. Therelevant alternative theorist holds, therefore, that you do know thatyou have hands.

The BIV argument is valid. Relevant alternative theorists musttherefore deny one of its premises. Since they agree that you don’tknow that your are not a BIV, they accept the first premise.Consequently, they reject the second premise. You know that you havehands even though you don’t know that you are not a BIV. This means, ineffect, that relevant alternative theorists deny the closure principle.Let’s consider the details of this point. Relevant alternativetheorists say:

1. You know you have hands.
2. You know that your having hands entails your not being a BIV.
3. You don’t know that you are not a BIV.

Relevant alternative theorists, then, assert the antecedent and denythe consequent of BIV closure, as stated in the previous section. Theyare, therefore, committed to the claim that the closure principle is false.[56]

There are two chief problems for this approach. The first is thatdenouncing the BIV alternative as irrelevant is ad hoc unlessit is supplemented with a principled account of what makes onealternative relevant and another irrelevant. The second is that theclosure principle enjoys a high degree of intrinsic plausibility.Denying it generates so-called abominable conjunctions. Here isone:

An Abominable Conjunction
I know that I have hands but I do not know that I am not a (handless)BIV.

Many epistemologists would agree that this conjunction is indeedabominable because it blatantly violates the basic and extremelyplausible intuition that you can’t know you have hands without knowingthat you are not a BIV.[57]

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5.4 The Moorean Response

Next, let us consider a response to the BIV argument according towhich it’s not the second but the first premise that must be rejected.G. E. Moore has pointed out that an argument succeeds only to theextent that its premises are more plausible than the conclusion. So ifwe encounter an argument whose conclusion we don’t like, and noticethat the denial of the conclusion is actually quite plausible, in factmore plausible than the assertion of the premises, then we can turn theargument on its head. According to this approach, we can respond to theBIV argument as follows:

Counter BIV
(1) I know that I have hands.(2) If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I havehands. Therefore:(3) I know that I am not a BIV.

Unless we are skeptics or opponents of closure, we would have toconcede that this argument is sound. It is valid, and its premises aretrue. Yet few philosophers would agree that Counter BIV amounts to asatisfying response to the BIV argument. What needs to be accomplishedis more than a mere assertion of (3), based on knowledge of one’shands. What we need to have explained to us is how one canknow that one is not a BIV. The observation that the premises of theBIV argument are less plausible than the denial of its conclusiondoesn’t help us understand how such knowledge is possible. That’s whythe Moorean response falls short of being a successful rebuttal of theskeptical argument.[58]

5.5 The Contextualist Response

We have looked at two responses to the BIV argument. The relevantalternatives response denies the second premise. Because of theplausibility of the second premise, this might strike us as adesperation move. The Moorean response denies the first premise. Theproblem with that move is this: Unless we are provided with aconvincing explanation of how one can know that one isn’t aBIV, it’s not more than just digging in one’s non-skeptical heels.According to contextualism, it’s possible to articulate a moresatisfying reply to the BIV argument. The trick is to focus on how weactually use the word ‘know’. If we do that, we’ll noticethat our use of that word varies from one situation — from onecontext — to another. What so varies is what we mean bythat word.

Three questions arise immediately. First, what are these variousmeanings of the word ‘know’? Second, why and how does whatwe mean by ‘know’ change from one context to another?Third, how does the context-sensitivity of ‘know’help us respond to the BIV argument? Let us consider each question inturn.

First, when what we mean by ‘know’ changes from onecontext to another, what changes is the standards that we think must bemet if someone is to have knowledge of something. For the sake ofkeeping things simple, let’s distinguish between just two sets ofstandards: very high and not so high. Let’s refer to them as‘high’ and ‘low’ standards. In some contexts,when we use the word ‘know’, we have low standards ofknowledge in mind: standards that are easy to meet. We will thenascribe knowledge liberally. In other contexts, our use of the word‘know’ is guided by more demanding high standards. Meetingthese is very difficult. In such contexts, we will ascribe knowledgeonly reluctantly. Second, what effects such changes in what we mean by‘know’? According to some contextualists, it is thesalience of error-possibilities. In an ordinary, low-standard context,you don’t worry about being a BIV. It’s an error possibility youignore. As a result, your standards of knowledge remain low. In such acontext, all it takes for you to know you have hands is that you candiscriminate between having hands and having stumps, hooks, orprosthetic hands. That’s a condition you easily meet. Hence you willnot be reluctant at all to ascribe to yourself knowledge of your hands.But suppose you start thinking about the problem of skepticism. You’rewondering how you could know that you are not a BIV. You come to notethat it’s very difficult to know that one isn’t a BIV. The BIValternative is now salient to you. This makes your standards ofknowledge rise. Bearing in mind that BIVs don’t have hands, you nowthink that, for you to know that you have hands, you must be able toeliminate the error possibility of being a BIV. Since you realize youcan’t eliminate that possibility, you are no longer willing to ascribeto yourself knowledge of your hands.

Third, how does all of that help us find a reply to the BIVargument? Contextualists view the BIV argument as presenting us with aparadox. We think it’s crazy to deny knowledge of our hands. At thesame time, we don’t think one can know that one isn’t a BIV. How canthe conflict between these thoughts be resolved? Contextualists proposeto resolve it by saying this: In low standard contexts (when skepticalhypotheses are not salient), the first premise and the conclusion ofthe BIV argument are both false. In such contexts, a speaker who says’You don’t know that you have hands’ or ‘You don’t know that you arenot a BIV’ is mistaken. The speaker is mistaken because we do in factmeet low standards of knowledge. So relative to what we meanby ‘know’ in such contexts, we know that we have hands andthat we are not BIVs. However, in high standard contexts (when an errorpossibility such as being a BIV is salient), the first premise and theconclusion of the BIV argument are both true. Now, when speakers say’You don’t know that you have hands’ or ‘You don’t know that you arenot a BIV’, they are correct, for with regard to having hands and beingor not being a BIV, our epistemic position is not strong enough for usto meet high standards of knowledge. Therefore, relative to what wemean by ‘know’ when we are confronted with a salient errorpossibility such as being a BIV, we know neither that we have hands northat we are not BIVs.

Contextualism is intended as a closure preserving responseto skepticism. The closure principle is true even relative to’knowledge’ attributions that are subject to high standards. Hence,according to contextualism, things fall into place as follows:

1. we know the closure principle whether the meaning of‘know’ is fixed by high or low standards;
2. when the meaning of ‘know’ is fixed by low standards,we know both that we have hands and that we are not BIVs;
3. when the meaning of ‘know’ is fixed by high standards,we know neither that we have hands nor that we are not BIVs.

As a result, closure is preserved. Contextualism is also meant to bean improvement over the Moorean response. According to that response,the first premise of the BIV argument is false. This conflicts with ourintuition that we cannot know that we are not BIVs. Contextualismresolves this conflict by saying that the first premise is false onlyin low standards contexts. In high standards contexts, that premise istrue.

Naturally, contextualism has elicited many objections. According toone, what’s wrong with contextualism is that it replaces our interestin knowledge itself with focus on the word ‘know’. Thisobjection (let us call it the replacement objection) is basedon a misunderstanding of contextualism. In the next section, we willsee why.

According to another objection, contextualism overemphasizes theimportance of the context sensitivity of the word ‘know’.Let us distinguish between two elements of contextualism. The first issemantic ascent. If we endorse the semantic ascent element, wethink that a satisfactory response to skepticism in general and the BIVargument in particular requires of us to distinguish between ahigh-standards and a low-standards meaning of ‘knowledge.’ The semanticascent thesis remains squarely within the limits of traditionalepistemology. Indeed, in any area of philosophy, it’s always going tobe a good idea to remain aware of the possibility that the problems inwhich one finds oneself entangled might, at least to some extent, bedue to subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) shifts in meaning. Theother element of contextualism could be called strictcontext-sensitivity, as opposed to loose context sensitivity.Consider the thesis that the meaning of the word ‘know’varies with context. There is an innocuous interpretation of thisthesis: people do not always mean the same when they use the word‘know’. Sometimes they mean one thing by‘know’, at other times they mean another thing by‘know’. This is loose context sensitivity. It’s hard to seeon what grounds such a weak claim might be disputed. Contextualists,however, make a stronger claim. They assert that what one means by‘know’ is determined, in a way that’s very difficult toresist, by the salience or non-salience of error possibilities. That’sstrict context sensitivity. If we endorse strict context sensitivity,there’s something important that drops out: how one intends touse the word ‘know’. An alternative semantics of the word‘know’ will de-emphasize the importance of the salience ornon-salience of error possibilities and ascribe a much higher degreeof semantic independence to the subjects who use the word‘know’. Next, let’s consider a response to the BIV argumentthat retains the semantic ascent element of contextualism, but rejectsstrong context sensitivity.[59]

5.6 The Ambiguity Response

What proposition a ‘knowledge’-attributing sentenceexpresses depends on what concept of knowledge the person whouses that sentence (in spoken or written form) has in mind when usingthe word ‘know’. Let’s distinguish between two concepts: ahigh-standards and a low-standards concept. There are various ways ofcashing out this distinction. We will understand it in terms offallible and infallible evidence. High-standards or infallibleknowledge of p requires p-entailing evidence.Low-standards of fallible knowledge of p requires adequateevidence for p, where evidence for p can be adequatewithout entailing p.

According to the ambiguity response, a ‘knowledge’-attributingsentence is ambiguous unless we can tell whether the word‘know’, as it occurs in that sentence, refers to fallibleor infallible knowledge. Suppose we think that fallible knowledge ofone’s hands is possible, whereas infallible knowledge of one’s hands isnot. Suppose further we hear Jane say ‘Carl knows that he hashands.’ Finally, suppose we have no idea whether Jane uses theword ‘know’ in the fallible or infallible sense. In thatcase, we would have to say that Jane’s utterance is true if interpretedas a claim about fallible knowledge, but false if interpreted as aclaim about infallible knowledge. Now, with regard to the BIV argument,we are in a similar situation. We have not been instructed on whetherthe word ‘know’ in its premises and its conclusion is to beunderstood in the fallible or infallible sense. Consequently, whenassessing the merits of the BIV argument, we must consider threeversions of it:

The Mixed Version
In the premises, the word ‘know’ refers to infallibleknowledge, whereas in the conclusion, it refers to fallible knowledge.

The High-Standards Version
The word ‘know’ refers to infallible knowledge in both thepremises and the conclusion.

The Low-Standards Version
The word ‘know’ refers to fallible knowledge in both thepremises and the conclusion.

Distinguishing between these three versions, proponents of theambiguity response can reply to the BIV argument as follows:

1. The mixed version is an instance of equivocation and thusinvalid.
2. The high-standards version is sound but uninteresting. Itsconclusion asserts that we don’t have infallible knowledge of ourhands. That’s nothing to worry about. What really matters to us iswhether we have fallible knowledge of our hands. But that questionsimply isn’t addressed by the high-standards version.
3. The low-standards version is interesting but unsound. Itsconclusion — we do not even have fallible knowledge of our hands — is indeed disturbing. If this conclusion were true, then wewould be in a radical way mistaken about what we think we know.However, we don’t have to accept this conclusion because the argument’sfirst premise is false. According to that premise, one cannot even havefallible knowledge of one’s not being a BIV. That’s false. There is,after all, good evidence for thinking that one’s is not a BIV. Thisevidence is good enough for knowing that one isn’t a BIV even though itdoes not entail that one isn’t a BIV.

Suppose an opponent of the ambiguity response were to employ thereplacement objection, claiming that the response focuses on the word‘know’ instead of knowledge itself. This objection would bemisguided. The ambiguity response mentions the word ‘know’only at the initial stage, and then immediately shifts its focus tonon-linguistic entities such as concepts and propositions. So advocatesof the ambiguity response would point out that, when we distinguishbetween versions (i) through (iii), we are concerned with whichpropositions the premises and the conclusion of the BIVargument express, and thus are ultimately concerned with knowledgeitself. The upshot of their reply, then, is to distinguish between thefollowing two propositions:

(Kif)I knowif that I have hands.(Kf)I knowf that I have hands.

where the term ‘knowif’ in(Kif) refers to infallible knowledge, whereas theterm ‘knowf’ in Kfrefers to fallible knowledge. Both of these proposition are aboutknowledge itself, or, more precisely, about different kinds ofknowledge. The ambiguity response, therefore, is not vulnerable to thereplacement objection. Neither is contextualism. For according tocontextualism, what context determines is precisely which propositionthe conclusion of the BIV argument expresses: (Kif)or (Kf).[60] Hence contextualism, is, notwithstandinginitial appearance, just as much about knowledge itself as is theambiguity response.

How, then, do contextualism and the ambiguity response differ? Bothshare the semantic ascent element. A satisfactory response toskepticism requires of us to distinguish between various meanings ofthe word ‘know’. Beyond that, they proceed in differentdirections. Whereas according to contextualism, whether we reject orendorse the conclusion of the BIV argument is a function of whichcontext we are in, the ambiguity response makes context irrelevant. Itmakes context irrelevant because, no matter which context we are in, wecan always disambiguate. So, when we are thinking about or discussingthe BIV argument and are thus confronted with a salient errorpossibility, we need not adopt a high-standards meaning of‘know’. Rather, we can respond to the argument by sayingthat, if it is about infallible knowledge its conclusion is true butunremarkable, whereas if it is about fallible knowledge its conclusionis remarkable but false.[61]

5.6 Knowing One Isn’t a BIV

Contextualism and the ambiguity response, as discussed in the previoustwo sections, leave out one important detail. Contextualists say that,relative to the standards of knowledge operational in low-standardscontexts, one can know that one isn’t a BIV. Ambiguity theorists saythat, in the fallibilist sense of ‘know’, one can know thatone isn’t a BIV. It might be objected that this is a bit optimistic.Let us look at the issue from the evidentialist point of view. Anevidentialist who employs the ambiguity response would have to say thatone’s evidence for thinking one isn’t a BIV is good enough forknowledge. But when the BIV hypothesis was introduced, we noted thatpart of the hypothesis is the following point: whether you are a normalperson or a BIV makes no difference with regard to your evidence: it’sthe same in either case. Call this the identical evidencethesis. This thesis is simply part of the hypothesis in questionand must therefore be granted. How, then, could one possibly know, evenin the fallibilist sense of ‘know’, that one isn’t a BIV?

It would be a mistake to think the identical evidence thesis entailsthat, as a normal person, one doesn’t have good evidence for thinkingthat one isn’t a BIV. Nor does it entail that, as a BIV, one doesn’thave good evidence for thinking that one isn’t a BIV. What it entailsis merely this: Whatever evidence one has, as a normal person regarding thequestion of whether one is a BIV, one would have that very sameevidence if one were a BIV. This leaves open the possibility that ineither case, as a BIV or as a normal person, one has excellent evidencefor thinking that one is not a BIV.

What might evidence for thinking that one isn’t a BIV consist of?For reasons of space, we will merely hint, by way of analogy, at howthis question might be answered. Note that the BIV hypothesis entailsvarious rather problematic propositions:

(a)At least one BIV exists.(b)The know-how needed for envatting people exists.©The technology needed for envatting peopleexists.

Compare:

(d)At least one spaceship exists that can be used fortraveling to another galaxy and coming back within a couple ofmonths.(e)The know-how needed for building such a spaceshipexists.(f)The technology needed for building such a spaceshipexists.

According to the evidentialist anti-skepticism under considerationhere, you know, on the basis of your knowledge of how the world works,that (d)–(f) are all false.[62] In the very least,you can come to know this by consulting suitable experts. Butwhat about (a) through ©? Well, if you know or can come to know that(d)–(f) are all false, isn’t it plausible to claim that you alsoknow or can come to know that (a)–© are all false? If a skepticwere to argue that you know that (d)–(f) are all false, while youdo not know that any proposition in (a)–© is false, thatskeptic would incur the burden of having to dislodge the analogy, ofhaving to explain why, whereas knowledge that (d)–(f) are allfalse is easily obtainable, knowledge of the falsehood of each(a)–© is beyond our reach. This might not be easilyaccomplished.

Suppose you do know that (a)–© are all false. Then you knowthat any proposition that entails (a)–© is false. TheBIV hypothesis entails (a)–©. Hence you know that the BIVhypothesis, is false. But if you know that you are not a BIV, thenpremise (1) of the BIV argument is false.[63]

6. Additional Issues

6.1 Virtue Epistemology

Epistemology, as commonly practiced, focuses on the subject’sbeliefs. Are they justified? Are they instances of knowledge? When itcomes to assessing how the subject herself is doing with regard to thepursuit of truth and the seeking of knowledge, this assessment iscarried out by looking at the epistemic quality of her beliefs.According to virtue epistemology, the order of analysis ought to bereversed. We need to begin with the subject herself and assess herepistemic virtues and vices: her ‘good’ and her ‘bad’ ways of formingbeliefs. Careful and attentive reasoning would be an example of anepistemic virtue; jumping to conclusions would be an example of anepistemic vice. It is only after we have determined which waysof forming beliefs count as epistemic virtues that we can, as a secondstep, determine the epistemic quality of particular beliefs. Itsproponents construe virtue epistemology more or less stringently.According to pure virtue epistemology, epistemic virtues and vices aresui generis. They cannot be analyzed in terms of morefundamental epistemic or nonepistemic concepts. Proponents of a lessstringent approach disagree with this; they would say that epistemicvirtues and vices can fruitfully be analyzed by employing otherconcepts. Indeed, according to an externalist strand of virtueepistemology, it is the very notion of reliability that we shouldemploy to capture the difference between epistemic virtues and vices.Stable ways of forming beliefs are epistemic virtues if and only ifthey tend to result in true beliefs, epistemic vices if and only ifthey tend to result in false beliefs. Virtue epistemology, thusconceived, is a form of reliabilism.[64]

6.2 Naturalistic Epistemology

According to an extreme version of naturalistic epistemology, theproject of traditional epistemology, pursued in an a priorifashion from the philosopher’s armchair, is completely misguided. The’fruits’ of such activity are demonstrably false theories such asfoundationalism, as well as endless and arcane debates in the attemptto tackle questions to which there are no answers. To bring epistemology onthe right path, it must be made a part of the natural sciences andbecome cognitive psychology. The aim of naturalistic epistemology thusunderstood is to replace traditional epistemology with analtogether new and redefined project. According to a moderate versionof naturalistic epistemology, one primary task of epistemology is toidentify how knowledge and justification are anchored in the naturalworld, just as it is the purpose of physics to explain phenomena like heatand cold, or thunder and lightning in terms of properties of thenatural world. The pursuit of this task does not require of itsproponents to replace traditional epistemology. Rather, this moderateapproach accepts the need for cooperation between traditionalconceptual analysis and empirical methods. The former is needed for thepurpose of establishing a conceptual link between knowledge andreliability, the latter for figuring out which cognitive processes arereliable and which are not.[65]

6.3 Religious Epistemology

In the history of philosophy, there are several famous arguments forthe existence of God: the ontological argument, the cosmologicalargument, and the argument from design. From an epistemological pointof view, the question is whether such arguments can constitute arational foundation of faith, or even give us knowledge of God. Afurther question is whether, if God exists, knowledge of God might notalso be possible in other ways, for example, on the basis of perceptionor perhaps mystical experiences. There is also a famous problem castingdoubt on the existence of God: Why, if God is an omniscient,omnipotent, and benevolent being, is there evil in the world? Here, theepistemological question is whether, based on this problem, we can knowthat God (thus conceived) does not exist. Another, central issue forreligious epistemology is raised by evidentialism. According toevidentialism, knowledge requires adequate evidence. However, theredoes not seem to be any adequate evidence of God’s existence. Is itpossible, then, for theists to endorse evidentialism?[66]

6.4 Moral Epistemology

The basic moral categories are those of right and wrong action. Whenwe do theoretical ethics, we wish to find out what it is that makes aright action right and a wrong action wrong. When we do practical orapplied ethics, we attempt to find out which actions are right andwhich are wrong. The epistemological question these areas of philosophyraise is this: How can we know any of that? Traditionally,philosophers have attempted to answer the questions of ethics viaintuition, a priori reasoning, and the consideration ofhypothetical cases. Some philosophers who belong to the naturalisticcamp consider this approach misguided because they think that it isunreliable and liable to produce results that merely reflect our owncultural and social biases. Among those who think that moral knowledgecan be acquired via intuition and a priori reasoning, aprimary question is whether the kind of justification such methods cangenerate is coherentist or foundationalist. Finally, a furtherimportant question is whether moral knowledge is at all possible.Knowledge requires truth and thus objective reality. According toanti-realists, there is no objective reality of, and thus no truthabout, moral matters. Since what is known must be true, it is not easyto see how, if anti-realism were correct, there could be knowledge ofmoral matters.[67]

6.5 Social Epistemology

When we conceive of epistemology as including knowledge andjustified belief as they are positioned within a particular social andhistorical context, epistemology becomes social epistemology. How topursue social epistemology is a matter of controversy. According tosome, it is an extension and reorientation of traditional epistemologywith the aim of correcting its overly individualistic orientation.According to others, social epistemology ought to amount to a radicaldeparture from traditional epistemology, which they see, like theadvocates of radical naturalization, as a futile endeavor. Those whofavor the former approach retain the thought that knowledge andjustified belief are essentially linked to truth as the goal of ourcognitive practices. They hold that there are objective norms ofrationality that social epistemologists should aspire to articulate.Those who prefer the more radical approach would reject the existenceof objective norms of rationality. Moreover, since many view scientificfacts as social constructions, they would deny that the goal of ourintellectual and scientific activities is to find facts. Suchconstructivism, if weak, asserts the epistemological claim thatscientific theories are laden with social, cultural, and historicalpresuppositions and biases; if strong, it asserts the metaphysicalclaim that truth and reality are themselves socially constructed.[68]

6.5 Feminist Epistemology

When construed in a non-controversial way, the subject matter offeminist epistemology consists of issues having to do with fair andequal access of women to, and their participation in, the institutionsand processes through which knowledge is generated and transmitted.Viewed this way, feminist epistemology can be seen as a branch ofsocial epistemology. When we move beyond this initial characterization,what feminist epistemology is will become a matter of controversy.According to some, it includes the project of studying and legitimizingspecial ways in which only women can acquire knowledge. According toothers, feminist epistemology should be understood as aiming at thepolitical goal of opposing and rectifying oppression in general and theoppression of women in particular. At the extreme end, feministepistemology is closely associated with postmodernism and its radicalattack on truth and the notion of objective reality.[69]

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The author would like to thank Earl Conee for his help, bothphilosophical and editorial. The editors would like to thank MichaelBeaton and Harry McCauley for suggesting improvements to the wordingof some of the above sentences.

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